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A new vehicle has appeared on the highways and streets, with
which it may safely be predicted, the courts and legislatures will
have much to do in the future. Already it is making a great de-
mand on their time. One cannot pick up a newspaper which does
not contain an account of the payment of a price in a court of
justice, for driving a motor car at an excessive speed, or of the
happening of some sad accident which could have been easily
avoided by the exercise of the slightest care.
It was not long ago that we read of the sentence of an autoist
by a French court, to three months' imprisonment and the payment
of four thousand dollars damages for causing the death of a per-
son by carelessly operating a motor car. Such was the price for
a death.
Are we to condemn the autoriobile as a dangerous machine?
The automobile, or "self-moving" carriage, has not as yet been
judicially defined. The only definition which the writer has been
able to find in any of the law books, is that in a law dictionary
which states that the term means, "All motor traction vehicles
capable of being propelled on ordinary roads. Specifically horse-
less carriages." 1
It has been declared that the automobile is a source of danger, 2
and capable of such a high rate of speed, and careless operation,
that regulation is necessary for the safety of the public. 1 Many
of the automobile acts, recently adopted by the various states,
expressly define the terms "automobile," and "motor car." For ex-
ample, in Rhode Island it is provided that the terms shall include
all vehicles propelled by power, other than muscular power, ex-
cepting railroads and railway cars, and motor vehicles, running
x. See English's Law Dict., p. 78.
Automobile vehicles have been divided into three classes; heavy omni-
buses or cars, for road use in carrying passengers or goods; pleasure carriages
for use in driving on the streets or roads in place of the ordinary horse and
carriage; bicycles, tricycles or quadricycles furnished with a motor, to relieve
the rider of the work of operating the pedals and to increase speed.
Ency. Brit., Vol. 25, p. 3o3.
2. Christie v. Elliott, 2x6 Ill., 3r, Bertels v. Laurel Run Turnfiike
Co., 31 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 129.
3. Com. v. Boyd, x88 Mass. 79.
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only upon rails or tracks, and steam rollers.4 The New York act
contains a similar provision. 5
There seems to be no question as to whether the term "car-
riage" includes the modem machine of transportation, for it has
been emphatically laid down in two cases that an automobile is a
carriage. 6
The court will assume judicial knowledge of an automobile
and its characteristics, and the consequences of its use, under a
statutory provision requiring courts to take judicial notice "of the
true significance of all English words and phrases." T
Whether a motor vehicle may be included within the general
terms of a statute passed before the horseless carriage was known,
and in use, it may be impossible to say, as such a question would
depend largely on the particular statute. In a District of Columbia
case it was held that a statute of the nature above mentioned, did
not include automobiles. 8
One who is motoring on the streets and highways may be said
to be "driving." 9
In the use of the public highways and streets by useful modem
vehicles of conveyance the authorities should be fair and should
not unnecessarily restrict their operation. The unpardonable prac-
tice of spotting speeding motor cars for the purpose of revenue is
to be condemned, as much as the reckless driving of the machines.
The automobile occupies a position of importance and interest
on the public ways. Its right to use the avenues of travel has
been judicially declared to be equal to the right of other vehicles. 110
4. See Pub. Laws R. I., Jan. 1904, chap. Ur57, sec. 7.
5. See Laws, N. Y., z9o4, vol. 2, chap. 538, sec. r, subd. 2.
6. Baker v. Fall River (Mass., 1905), 72 N. E. Rep. 33§; Com. v. Haw-
kins, 14 Pa. Dist. Rep. 502.
7. EJ zParte Berry (Cal., 1965), 82 Pac. Rep. 44, wherein the court said:
We may assume . . . to have what is common and correct knowledge
about an automobile. Its use as a vehicle for traveling is comparatively re-
cent. It makes an unusual noise. It can be, and usually is, made to go on
common roads at great velocity-at a speed many times greater than that of
ordinary vehicles hauled by animals; and, beyond doubt, it is highly danger-
ous when used on country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives
of the mass of the people who travel on such roads in vehicles drawn by
horses, Fearful accidents to persons driving animals which are frightened
into unmanageable terror by automobiles are of common occurrence."
8. Washington Electric Vehicle Trans. Co. v. District of Columbta,
ig App. Cas. (D. C.) 462. But see Com. v. Hawkins, 14 Pa. Dist Rep. S92.
9. Com. v. Crowninshield, 187 Mass. 221.
io. Christie v. Elliott, 2x6, Ill., 31; Indiana Sfirings Co. v. Brown (Ind.
x9o5), 74 N. E. Rep. 6rx. See also Uiton v. Windham, 75 Com. 288.
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Is this declaration true? Independently of statutory regula-
tion, and in theory, it is, but as a practical result of the statutory en-
actments concerning the registration and licensing of automobiles,
the rights of the owners thereof are unequal compared with the
rights of the owners of other vehicles, yet not illegally unequal
since legislation especially regulating the right to operate motor
carriages as a class, is constitutional," and the automobile has no
right to run on the public ways unless the owner has complied with
the .zonditions prescribed in statutory provisions. 12
It seems that a turnpike company has the power to exclude
motor vehicles from its road because of the danger caused by
their use,13 and it has been held that an ordinance passed by county
supervisors, which prohibited the running of automobiles on
country roads between sunset and sunrise was not void as un-
reasonable."' Prohibiting the use of country roads at night would
seem to be exercising the right to regulate motoring to its limit,
and possibly beyond lawful regulating power; especially in view
of the fact that horses have no superior rights on the road. Such
a regulation comes very near amounting to prohibition. The
frightening of horses, beyond doubt, is an incident to the lawful
use of the public highways and does not constitute a wrong per se.
Even after having obtained authority to operate one's car in
the state, county or city, the license is a protection only within
the jurisdiction of the authorities granting it, 15 except where by
statute non-resident licensed operators are exempt. Thus in
Rhode Island it is provided that machines owned by non-residents
and driven by persons residing and registered in some other state
may be operated on the roads and highways. 16
A provision of an act regulating owners of automobiles to
take out a license is obscure where the title provides for licensing
operators. The titie is misleading and the owner may be one per-
son and the operator another. Even though the legislature may
have intended to license the machine or the operators, a penal
statute must be taken as it is written. IT In line with the discus-
sion of the motor car's rights on the public ways, it should be
mentioned that it has been held under act of Congress that an
automobile under power has no right on a ferry boat. 18
ix. Christie v, Elliott, 216 III., 31; Com. v. Boyd, 188 Mass., 79; People
v. Schneider (Mch., z9o5), 1o3 N. W. Rep. 172; Pefile V. Mac Williams, 91
N. Y. App. Div. 176; Com. vi. Densmore, x3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 639.
12. Bertels v,. Laurel Run Turnfiike Co., 31 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 129. But
see Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App, 94.
13. Bertels v. Laurel Run Turnfiike Co., 31 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 129.
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One who operates an automobile should possess something
more than expert knowledge of the machine's construction, or the
best mode of operating to obtain the greatest power and speed. A
motor vehicle is not a machine of danger when controlled by an
intelligent prudent driver. The hazard to which the safety of
pedestrians and, in most cases, persons with horses, may be ex-
posed, results from the personal part played in motoring, rather
than from the nature of the vehicle. It is evident therefore, that
it is in the manner of driving the machine, and that alone, which
threatens the public safety. The ability immediately to stop, its
quick response to guidance, its unconfined sphere of action, seem
to make the automobile one of the least dangerous of conveyances
if properly driven.
Xenophon P. Huddy.
14 Exparte Berry (Cal. 19o5), 82 Pac. Rep. 44. In this case the court said:
"While there are usually laws regulating and limiting the speed at which
they [automobiles] may be driven, it is a matter of common knowledge that
these laws are frequently violated, and that it is exceedingly difficult for offi-
cers, even in the daytime, to stop them when going at forbidden speed and
arrest the drivers. And it is apparent that this would be much: more difficult
to do in the night time. Moreover, in the nighttime, even those drivers of
automobiles who might be considerate of the safety of others, would not be
able to see an approaching team in time to take the proper precaution. Con-
sidering these matters, and many others which might be suggested, we see
nothing unreasonable in the regulation, which forbids the use of automobiles
on country roads in the night time. Of course, if the use of automobiles grad
ually becomes more common, there may come a time when an ordinance like
the one here in question would be unreasonable. As country horses are fre-
quently driven into cities and towns, many of them will gradually become
accustomed to the sight of automobiles, and the danger of their use on coun-
try roads will grow less."
Y5. State v. Cobb (Mo. App., 1905), 87 S. W. Rep. 55x.
05. See Pub. Laws R. I., Jan., 19o4, Chap. 1157, sec. 5.
17, Com. V. Densmore, 13, Penn. Dist. Rep. 639, 29 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 217.
i8. The Texas, 134 Fed. Rep. 9o9.
